rustls::client::danger

Trait ServerCertVerifier

source 
pub trait ServerCertVerifier:
    Debug
    + Send
    + Sync {
    // Required methods
    fn verify_server_cert(
        &self,
        end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>,
        intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>],
        server_name: &ServerName<'_>,
        ocsp_response: &[u8],
        now: UnixTime,
    ) -> Result<ServerCertVerified, Error>;
    fn verify_tls12_signature(
        &self,
        message: &[u8],
        cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
        dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
    ) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error>;
    fn verify_tls13_signature(
        &self,
        message: &[u8],
        cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
        dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
    ) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error>;
    fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme>;
}
Expand description

Something that can verify a server certificate chain, and verify signatures made by certificates.

Required Methods§

source

fn verify_server_cert( &self, end_entity: &CertificateDer<'_>, intermediates: &[CertificateDer<'_>], server_name: &ServerName<'_>, ocsp_response: &[u8], now: UnixTime, ) -> Result<ServerCertVerified, Error>

Verify the end-entity certificate end_entity is valid for the hostname dns_name and chains to at least one trust anchor.

intermediates contains all certificates other than end_entity that were sent as part of the server’s Certificate message. It is in the same order that the server sent them and may be empty.

Note that none of the certificates have been parsed yet, so it is the responsibility of the implementor to handle invalid data. It is recommended that the implementor returns [Error::InvalidCertificate(CertificateError::BadEncoding)] when these cases are encountered.

source

fn verify_tls12_signature( &self, message: &[u8], cert: &CertificateDer<'_>, dss: &DigitallySignedStruct, ) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error>

Verify a signature allegedly by the given server certificate.

message is not hashed, and needs hashing during the verification. The signature and algorithm are within dss. cert contains the public key to use.

cert has already been validated by ServerCertVerifier::verify_server_cert.

If and only if the signature is valid, return Ok(HandshakeSignatureValid). Otherwise, return an error – rustls will send an alert and abort the connection.

This method is only called for TLS1.2 handshakes. Note that, in TLS1.2, SignatureSchemes such as SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 are not in fact bound to the specific curve implied in their name.

source

fn verify_tls13_signature( &self, message: &[u8], cert: &CertificateDer<'_>, dss: &DigitallySignedStruct, ) -> Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error>

Verify a signature allegedly by the given server certificate.

This method is only called for TLS1.3 handshakes.

This method is very similar to verify_tls12_signature: but note the tighter ECDSA SignatureScheme semantics – e.g. SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 must only validate signatures using public keys on the right curve – rustls does not enforce this requirement for you.

cert has already been validated by ServerCertVerifier::verify_server_cert.

If and only if the signature is valid, return Ok(HandshakeSignatureValid). Otherwise, return an error – rustls will send an alert and abort the connection.

source

fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme>

Return the list of SignatureSchemes that this verifier will handle, in verify_tls12_signature and verify_tls13_signature calls.

This should be in priority order, with the most preferred first.

Implementors§