pub struct EndEntityCert<'a> { /* private fields */ }Expand description
An end-entity certificate.
Server certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of several steps. All of these steps are necessary:
-
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert: Verify that the server’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS server. -
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_subject_name: Verify that the server’s certificate is valid for the host or IP address that is being connected to. -
EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the signature of server’sServerKeyExchangemessage is valid for the server’s certificate.
Client certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of analogous steps. All of these steps are necessary:
EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert: Verify that the client’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS client.EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the client’s signature in itsCertificateVerifymessage is valid using the public key from the client’s certificate.
Although it would be less error-prone to combine all these steps into a
single function call, some significant optimizations are possible if the
three steps are processed separately (in parallel). It does not matter much
which order the steps are done in, but all of these steps must completed
before application data is sent and before received application data is
processed. EndEntityCert::from is an inexpensive operation and is
deterministic, so if these tasks are done in multiple threads, it is
probably best to just call EndEntityCert::from multiple times (before each
operation) for the same DER-encoded ASN.1 certificate bytes.
Implementations§
source§impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>
sourcepub fn verify_for_usage<'p>(
&'p self,
supported_sig_algs: &[&dyn SignatureVerificationAlgorithm],
trust_anchors: &'p [TrustAnchor<'_>],
intermediate_certs: &'p [CertificateDer<'p>],
time: UnixTime,
usage: KeyUsage,
revocation: Option<RevocationOptions<'_>>,
verify_path: Option<&dyn Fn(&VerifiedPath<'_>) -> Result<(), Error>>,
) -> Result<VerifiedPath<'p>, Error>
pub fn verify_for_usage<'p>( &'p self, supported_sig_algs: &[&dyn SignatureVerificationAlgorithm], trust_anchors: &'p [TrustAnchor<'_>], intermediate_certs: &'p [CertificateDer<'p>], time: UnixTime, usage: KeyUsage, revocation: Option<RevocationOptions<'_>>, verify_path: Option<&dyn Fn(&VerifiedPath<'_>) -> Result<(), Error>>, ) -> Result<VerifiedPath<'p>, Error>
Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use against the specified Extended Key Usage (EKU).
supported_sig_algsis the list of signature algorithms that are trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s public key is not validated against this list.trust_anchorsis the list of root CAs to trust in the built path.intermediate_certsis the sequence of intermediate certificates that a peer sent for the purpose of path building.timeis the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current time).usageis the intended usage of the certificate, indicating what kind of usage we’re verifying the certificate for.crlsis the list of certificate revocation lists to check the certificate against.verify_pathis an optional verification function for path candidates.
If successful, yields a VerifiedPath type that can be used to inspect a verified chain
of certificates that leads from the end_entity to one of the self.trust_anchors.
verify_path will only be called for potentially verified paths, that is, paths that
have been verified up to the trust anchor. As such, verify_path() cannot be used to
verify a path that doesn’t satisfy the constraints listed above; it can only be used to
reject a path that does satisfy the aforementioned constraints. If verify_path returns
an error, path building will continue in order to try other options.
sourcepub fn verify_is_valid_for_subject_name(
&self,
server_name: &ServerName<'_>,
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_is_valid_for_subject_name( &self, server_name: &ServerName<'_>, ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies that the certificate is valid for the given Subject Name.
sourcepub fn verify_signature(
&self,
signature_alg: &dyn SignatureVerificationAlgorithm,
msg: &[u8],
signature: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), Error>
pub fn verify_signature( &self, signature_alg: &dyn SignatureVerificationAlgorithm, msg: &[u8], signature: &[u8], ) -> Result<(), Error>
Verifies the signature signature of message msg using the
certificate’s public key.
signature_alg is the algorithm to use to
verify the signature; the certificate’s public key is verified to be
compatible with this algorithm.
For TLS 1.2, signature corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.signature and signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s
DigitallySigned.algorithm of TLS type SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. In
TLS 1.2 a single SignatureAndHashAlgorithm may map to multiple
SignatureVerificationAlgorithms. For example, a TLS 1.2
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm of (ECDSA, SHA-256) may map to any or all
of {ECDSA_P256_SHA256, ECDSA_P384_SHA256}, depending on how the TLS
implementation is configured.
For current TLS 1.3 drafts, signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s
algorithm fields of type SignatureScheme. There is (currently) a
one-to-one correspondence between TLS 1.3’s SignatureScheme and
SignatureVerificationAlgorithm.
Methods from Deref<Target = Cert<'a>>§
sourcepub fn valid_dns_names(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &str>
pub fn valid_dns_names(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &str>
Returns a list of valid DNS names provided in the subject alternative names extension
This function must not be used to implement custom DNS name verification. Checking that a certificate is valid for a given subject name should always be done with EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name.
sourcepub fn subject_public_key_info(&self) -> SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'_>
pub fn subject_public_key_info(&self) -> SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'_>
Get the RFC 5280-compliant SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer (SPKI) of this Cert.
sourcepub fn der(&self) -> CertificateDer<'a>
pub fn der(&self) -> CertificateDer<'a>
Raw DER encoded representation of the certificate.