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// Copyright 2016 Brian Smith.
// Portions Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
use super::{quic::Sample, Nonce};
use crate::cpu;
#[cfg(any(
test,
not(any(
target_arch = "aarch64",
target_arch = "arm",
target_arch = "x86",
target_arch = "x86_64"
))
))]
mod fallback;
use crate::polyfill::ArraySplitMap;
use core::ops::RangeFrom;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Key {
words: [u32; KEY_LEN / 4],
cpu_features: cpu::Features,
}
impl Key {
pub(super) fn new(value: [u8; KEY_LEN], cpu_features: cpu::Features) -> Self {
Self {
words: value.array_split_map(u32::from_le_bytes),
cpu_features,
}
}
pub(super) fn cpu_features(&self) -> cpu::Features {
self.cpu_features
}
}
impl Key {
#[inline]
pub fn encrypt_in_place(&self, counter: Counter, in_out: &mut [u8]) {
self.encrypt_less_safe(counter, in_out, 0..);
}
#[inline]
pub fn encrypt_iv_xor_in_place(&self, iv: Iv, in_out: &mut [u8; 32]) {
// It is safe to use `into_counter_for_single_block_less_safe()`
// because `in_out` is exactly one block long.
debug_assert!(in_out.len() <= BLOCK_LEN);
self.encrypt_less_safe(iv.into_counter_for_single_block_less_safe(), in_out, 0..);
}
#[inline]
pub fn new_mask(&self, sample: Sample) -> [u8; 5] {
let mut out: [u8; 5] = [0; 5];
let iv = Iv::assume_unique_for_key(sample);
debug_assert!(out.len() <= BLOCK_LEN);
self.encrypt_less_safe(iv.into_counter_for_single_block_less_safe(), &mut out, 0..);
out
}
/// Analogous to `slice::copy_within()`.
pub fn encrypt_within(&self, counter: Counter, in_out: &mut [u8], src: RangeFrom<usize>) {
// XXX: The x86 and at least one branch of the ARM assembly language
// code doesn't allow overlapping input and output unless they are
// exactly overlapping. TODO: Figure out which branch of the ARM code
// has this limitation and come up with a better solution.
//
// https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4362
if cfg!(any(target_arch = "arm", target_arch = "x86")) && src.start != 0 {
let len = in_out.len() - src.start;
in_out.copy_within(src, 0);
self.encrypt_in_place(counter, &mut in_out[..len]);
} else {
self.encrypt_less_safe(counter, in_out, src);
}
}
/// This is "less safe" because it skips the important check that `encrypt_within` does.
/// Only call this with `src` equal to `0..` or from `encrypt_within`.
#[inline]
fn encrypt_less_safe(&self, counter: Counter, in_out: &mut [u8], src: RangeFrom<usize>) {
#[cfg(any(
target_arch = "aarch64",
target_arch = "arm",
target_arch = "x86",
target_arch = "x86_64"
))]
#[inline(always)]
pub(super) fn ChaCha20_ctr32(
key: &Key,
counter: Counter,
in_out: &mut [u8],
src: RangeFrom<usize>,
) {
let in_out_len = in_out.len().checked_sub(src.start).unwrap();
// There's no need to worry if `counter` is incremented because it is
// owned here and we drop immediately after the call.
prefixed_extern! {
fn ChaCha20_ctr32(
out: *mut u8,
in_: *const u8,
in_len: crate::c::size_t,
key: &[u32; KEY_LEN / 4],
counter: &Counter,
);
}
unsafe {
ChaCha20_ctr32(
in_out.as_mut_ptr(),
in_out[src].as_ptr(),
in_out_len,
key.words_less_safe(),
&counter,
)
}
}
#[cfg(not(any(
target_arch = "aarch64",
target_arch = "arm",
target_arch = "x86",
target_arch = "x86_64"
)))]
use fallback::ChaCha20_ctr32;
ChaCha20_ctr32(self, counter, in_out, src);
}
#[inline]
pub(super) fn words_less_safe(&self) -> &[u32; KEY_LEN / 4] {
&self.words
}
}
/// Counter || Nonce, all native endian.
#[repr(transparent)]
pub struct Counter([u32; 4]);
impl Counter {
pub fn zero(nonce: Nonce) -> Self {
Self::from_nonce_and_ctr(nonce, 0)
}
fn from_nonce_and_ctr(nonce: Nonce, ctr: u32) -> Self {
let [n0, n1, n2] = nonce.as_ref().array_split_map(u32::from_le_bytes);
Self([ctr, n0, n1, n2])
}
pub fn increment(&mut self) -> Iv {
let iv = Iv(self.0);
self.0[0] += 1;
iv
}
/// This is "less safe" because it hands off management of the counter to
/// the caller.
#[cfg(any(
test,
not(any(
target_arch = "aarch64",
target_arch = "arm",
target_arch = "x86",
target_arch = "x86_64"
))
))]
fn into_words_less_safe(self) -> [u32; 4] {
self.0
}
}
/// The IV for a single block encryption.
///
/// Intentionally not `Clone` to ensure each is used only once.
pub struct Iv([u32; 4]);
impl Iv {
fn assume_unique_for_key(value: [u8; 16]) -> Self {
Self(value.array_split_map(u32::from_le_bytes))
}
fn into_counter_for_single_block_less_safe(self) -> Counter {
Counter(self.0)
}
}
pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
const BLOCK_LEN: usize = 64;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
extern crate alloc;
use super::*;
use crate::test;
use alloc::vec;
const MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET: (usize, usize) = (15, 259);
const MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET_SUBSET: (usize, usize) =
if cfg!(any(debug_assertions = "false", feature = "slow_tests")) {
MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET
} else {
(0, 0)
};
#[test]
fn chacha20_test_default() {
// Always use `MAX_OFFSET` if we hav assembly code.
let max_offset = if cfg!(any(
target_arch = "aarch64",
target_arch = "arm",
target_arch = "x86",
target_arch = "x86_64"
)) {
MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET
} else {
MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET_SUBSET
};
chacha20_test(max_offset, Key::encrypt_within);
}
// Smoketest the fallback implementation.
#[test]
fn chacha20_test_fallback() {
chacha20_test(MAX_ALIGNMENT_AND_OFFSET_SUBSET, fallback::ChaCha20_ctr32);
}
// Verifies the encryption is successful when done on overlapping buffers.
//
// On some branches of the 32-bit x86 and ARM assembly code the in-place
// operation fails in some situations where the input/output buffers are
// not exactly overlapping. Such failures are dependent not only on the
// degree of overlapping but also the length of the data. `encrypt_within`
// works around that.
fn chacha20_test(
max_alignment_and_offset: (usize, usize),
f: impl for<'k, 'i> Fn(&'k Key, Counter, &'i mut [u8], RangeFrom<usize>),
) {
// Reuse a buffer to avoid slowing down the tests with allocations.
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1300];
test::run(test_file!("chacha_tests.txt"), move |section, test_case| {
assert_eq!(section, "");
let key = test_case.consume_bytes("Key");
let key: &[u8; KEY_LEN] = key.as_slice().try_into()?;
let key = Key::new(*key, cpu::features());
let ctr = test_case.consume_usize("Ctr");
let nonce = test_case.consume_bytes("Nonce");
let input = test_case.consume_bytes("Input");
let output = test_case.consume_bytes("Output");
// Run the test case over all prefixes of the input because the
// behavior of ChaCha20 implementation changes dependent on the
// length of the input.
for len in 0..=input.len() {
chacha20_test_case_inner(
&key,
&nonce,
ctr as u32,
&input[..len],
&output[..len],
&mut buf,
max_alignment_and_offset,
&f,
);
}
Ok(())
});
}
fn chacha20_test_case_inner(
key: &Key,
nonce: &[u8],
ctr: u32,
input: &[u8],
expected: &[u8],
buf: &mut [u8],
(max_alignment, max_offset): (usize, usize),
f: &impl for<'k, 'i> Fn(&'k Key, Counter, &'i mut [u8], RangeFrom<usize>),
) {
const ARBITRARY: u8 = 123;
for alignment in 0..=max_alignment {
buf[..alignment].fill(ARBITRARY);
let buf = &mut buf[alignment..];
for offset in 0..=max_offset {
let buf = &mut buf[..(offset + input.len())];
buf[..offset].fill(ARBITRARY);
let src = offset..;
buf[src.clone()].copy_from_slice(input);
let ctr = Counter::from_nonce_and_ctr(
Nonce::try_assume_unique_for_key(nonce).unwrap(),
ctr,
);
f(key, ctr, buf, src);
assert_eq!(&buf[..input.len()], expected)
}
}
}
}